Per-category censorship classifiers (NEWS / ANON / GRP / PORN / COMT / MMED / SRCH)
v3.3 answers is this country-day censoring something? The per-method classifier (also shipped 2026-05-21) answers HOW are they blocking it — DNS, TCP, HTTP, or TLS? This finding answers the journalist-gold question that sits between them: WHAT are they targeting?
The distinction matters editorially. A regime that blocks just ANON (Tor / VPNs / Lantern / Psiphon) is suppressing circumvention — that's a tell of internal political pressure, not free-press repression. A regime that blocks just NEWS (BBC / NYT / Guardian / Substack) is muzzling journalism. A regime that blocks SRCH (Google / DuckDuckGo) is taking a much heavier hand. The 7 promoted per-category classifiers expose those signals at the API.
Approach
Each classifier uses the same 16-feature v3.3 input (anomaly_rate, measurement_count, spike_magnitude, weekday/month/weekend, probe-block-rate, neighbor-contagion features, etc.) trained with class-balanced XGBoost. The category label is positive iff the country-day had ≥1 evidence row whose blocked domain matches that Citizen Lab category. Only ~18 distinct domains in the evidence table have domain_category populated, so we back-fill via a 37-domain hand-curated map covering NEWS (bbc, nytimes, guardian, ...), ANON (tor, protonvpn, psiphon, lantern, ...), COMT (signal, telegram, whatsapp, ...), and the rest. Negatives are category-agnostic (same negative row used for every category) so we don't leak "wrong-category" signal into the negative pool.
Results: 7 of 7 categories with data promoted
| Category | Pos labels | Strat AUC | LOCO median AUC | Promote path |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NEWS | 176 | 0.942 | 0.897 | alt-AUC |
| ANON | 194 | 0.921 | 0.866 | alt-AUC |
| GRP | 287 | 0.913 | 0.858 | alt-AUC |
| PORN | 85 | 0.977 | 0.957 | alt-AUC |
| COMT | 232 | 0.933 | 0.856 | alt-AUC |
| MMED | 230 | 0.935 | 0.849 | alt-AUC (bonus) |
| SRCH | 120 | 0.971 | 0.924 | alt-AUC (bonus) |
| POLR | 0 | — | — | SKIP |
| RELR | 0 | — | — | SKIP |
5 of 7 primary categories cleared (needed 4) — family promote passes. POLR (political opposition) and RELR (religion) are honestly skipped because zero rows in our evidence table currently match those Citizen Lab categories. The endpoint returns available: false with a transparent reason rather than a hallucinated probability.
Top countries per category (training-time)
- NEWS: RU (0.378 mean prob), BD, QA, PK, VE, IN — Russia leads journalism-targeting
- ANON: AZ (0.508) — Azerbaijan top for VPN/Tor blocking
- GRP: EG (0.498) — Egypt top for social-organizing blocks
- PORN: QA (0.198) — Qatar leads adult-content blocking
- COMT: PK (0.587) — Pakistan top for messaging-tool blocks
- MMED: EG (0.469) — Egypt top for YouTube/Instagram/Tumblr
- SRCH: QA (0.233) — Qatar top for search-engine blocking
Promote gate
Floors are deliberately softer than v3.3's gate because per-category labels are ~5–7% positive rate (vs v3.3's 26%), so F1 at threshold 0.5 punishes any high-precision-low-recall model. We use either:
- Classic path: stratified F1 ≥ 0.55 AND LOCO median F1 ≥ 0.60, OR
- Alt-AUC path: stratified AUC ≥ 0.75 AND LOCO median AUC ≥ 0.70 AND threshold-optimal F1 ≥ 0.40
All 7 promoted categories cleared the alt-AUC path with margin (lowest LOCO AUC was COMT at 0.856).
Honest caveats
- Citizen Lab categories cover ~14K domains; only 18 distinct domains in our evidence have the column populated. The 37-domain hand-curated back-fill is editorial — we cite the source.
- Categories aren't mutually exclusive (BBC is NEWS but used heavily for COMT via live chat). Each model is independent; a country can be flagged for multiple categories on the same day.
- Per-country coverage is uneven. LOCO AUC is the honest generalization signal.
- The probability is NOT a counterfactual ("would they block this without X?") — it's a learned association between country-day anomaly shape and category-positive labels.
- v3.3 generic classifier remains the production default. This is an additive transparency layer, not a replacement.
- POLR and RELR are honest-skipped — the endpoint flags them explicitly. We will retrain when evidence coverage expands.
Endpoints
GET /v1/classifier/category/info— per-category metrics, feature importance, honest caveatsGET /v1/classifier/category/{category}/{cc}— per-category probability for that country todayGET /v1/classifier/category/leaderboard?category=NEWS— training-time top countries for the category