A private place
to talk.

Open msg.voidly.ai in Safari, tap the Share button (square with arrow), then tap "Add to Home Screen". The app will appear on your Home Screen like a native app — full screen, no browser chrome, with its own icon.

The App Store requires Apple review, which can delay updates and restrict features. As a Progressive Web App (PWA), Veil updates instantly, works offline, and gives you the same experience without gatekeepers. iOS 16.4+ supports push notifications, standalone display, and all the Web APIs we need.

Yes. Every message is encrypted on your device before it leaves. The relay server only sees ciphertext it cannot read. We use Double Ratchet (same algorithm as Signal) for forward secrecy — if a key is compromised, past and future messages stay encrypted. On top of that, ML-KEM-768 post-quantum protection guards against future quantum computers.

ML-KEM-768 (NIST FIPS 203) is a new encryption standard designed to resist quantum computer attacks. Veil uses a hybrid approach: classical X25519 + post-quantum ML-KEM-768. Both must be broken simultaneously to compromise a session. This protects against "harvest now, decrypt later" attacks where someone records your encrypted traffic today hoping to crack it with a future quantum computer.

No — not the content. Private keys are generated and stored locally on your device in IndexedDB, and the relay only ever holds ciphertext it cannot decrypt. Message metadata is a separate question: the relay does see timing, message size class, and (on the legacy 1:1 rail and for standard channels) some routing information. We publish exactly what the relay can and cannot see at msg.voidly.ai/security/metadata-privacy — we would rather disclose than overclaim.

Calls use WebRTC for direct peer-to-peer connections. Call signaling (connecting you to the other person) goes through the encrypted relay, but the actual audio/video stream flows directly between devices. STUN/TURN servers handle NAT traversal so calls work even behind firewalls.

You can set messages to auto-delete after 5 minutes, 1 hour, 24 hours, or 7 days. The app removes expired messages, but a timer cannot prevent a recipient from saving a copy or taking a screenshot. This is set per-conversation, so you can have some chats permanent and others ephemeral.

Yes. While designed primarily for iPhone (where App Store alternatives are limited), Veil works on any modern browser. On Android, Chrome will prompt you to install it as a PWA. On desktop, it works in any browser as a regular web app.

Each user gets a unique did:voidly: identity derived from their cryptographic keys. Share your DID via QR code (scan in person), copy-paste it, or search the directory by name. There is no phone number or email required — your identity is purely cryptographic.

It depends on which backups you exported first. Your identity backup (passphrase-encrypted, from Settings) restores your keys and identity on a new device — but NOT your message history. Message history is encrypted and device-local; the relay cannot re-serve it, so it is lost on a wipe or reinstall unless you separately exported a passphrase-encrypted history backup (.veilhist). Cloud settings sync only covers display name, theme, and preferences — not messages. Without any backup, you would need to create a new identity, and a forgotten backup passphrase means permanent loss (there is no reset).

Deniable auth uses HMAC-SHA256 instead of Ed25519 signatures. Both parties in a conversation can produce the same MAC, meaning neither can cryptographically prove the other sent a specific message. This provides plausible deniability — critical for people in adversarial regimes where proving authorship could be dangerous.

When you enable its separate cover-traffic switch in Settings, Veil sends periodic decoy packets and a constant send cadence so a network observer has a harder time telling when you are actually communicating versus generating noise. It is an honest mitigation, not a mixnet: it makes timing correlation costly, not impossible. A global adversary watching all network egress can still correlate by IP and timing over time — for the strongest hiding, also use Tor or a VPN.