HTTP blocking in China: instagram.com, twitter.com, whatsapp.com, youtube.com
China · February 5, 2026 · 23 hours
CensoredPlanet Hyperquack detected HTTP/HTTPS blocking for 4 domains
Evidence
54%
Anomaly Rate
4
Measurements
85%
Confidence
What This Means
54% of 4 network tests from China failed to reach these services. Global baseline failure rate is typically 1-3%. This 51+ percentage point difference strongly indicates intentional blocking.
How We Detected This
Data Sourcecensoredplanet
ML ModelGradientBoosting v3.3 (LOCO median F1 0.87, honest across 127 countries)
Confidence Score85% certainty of censorship
Detection TimeFebruary 5, 2026
Corroborating Evidence (11)
Evidence collected from multiple independent sources. Upstream claims shown in quotes are not Voidly assertions.
Censored PlanetUniversity of Michigan research11 records
http-blocking-tcp-reset
"HTTP blocking (tcp-reset): 12/24 probes blocked (50.0%) for instagram.com"— Censored Planet report
Signal value: 0.50
Feb 5, 2026
View source →http-blocking-tcp-reset
"HTTP blocking (tcp-reset): 12/24 probes blocked (50.0%) for twitter.com"— Censored Planet report
Signal value: 0.50
Feb 5, 2026
View source →http-blocking-tcp-reset
"HTTP blocking (tcp-reset): 12/24 probes blocked (50.0%) for whatsapp.com"— Censored Planet report
Signal value: 0.50
Feb 5, 2026
View source →http-blocking-tcp-reset
"HTTP blocking (tcp-reset): 13/24 probes blocked (54.2%) for youtube.com"— Censored Planet report
Signal value: 0.54
Feb 5, 2026
View source →http-blocking-tcp-reset
"HTTP blocking (tcp-reset): 2/24 probes blocked (8.3%) for bbc.com"— Censored Planet report
Signal value: 0.08
Feb 5, 2026
View source →+ 6 more Censored Planet records
Affected Services (11)
BBCFacebookInstagramMediumNew York TimesTelegramTikTokTwitter/XWhatsAppXYouTube
Blocked Domains (11)
bbc.comfacebook.cominstagram.commedium.comnytimes.comreddit.comtelegram.orgtiktok.comtwitter.comwhatsapp.comyoutube.com
Click any domain to view raw OONI measurements
What we cannot say
- Who caused it — measurement data alone does not attribute this to any government, ISP, or other actor.
- Intent — anomalous or unreachable measurements indicate interference, not a stated motive or a deliberate-vs-incidental determination.
- Which networks — no specific ASN/ISP is identified for this incident.
- The mechanism — we cannot state whether this was DNS tampering, TLS/SNI reset, an HTTP blockpage, throttling, or an infrastructure outage.
- Sub-national scope — measurement is aggregated at the country level; we cannot localize to a province, city, or network segment.
- Independent corroboration — this rests on a single source; treat it as a single-source signal, not a multi-source confirmation.
Cite This Incident
Voidly Research. (2026). HTTP blocking in China: instagram.com, twitter.com, whatsapp.com, youtube.com [CN-2026-0006]. Voidly Global Censorship Index. https://voidly.ai/incident/CN-2026-0006
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