Active Incident
Confirmed: post-protest continued blocks
Iran · January 1, 2023 · 17 days
OONI detected censorship pattern in Iran. Post-protest continued blocks. Anomaly rate: 100.0%
Evidence
100%
Anomaly Rate
23,435
Measurements
90%
Confidence
What This Means
100% of 23,435 network tests from Iran failed to reach these services. Global baseline failure rate is typically 1-3%. This 97+ percentage point difference strongly indicates intentional blocking.
How We Detected This
Data Sourceooni
ML ModelGradientBoosting v3.3 (LOCO median F1 0.87, honest across 127 countries)
Confidence Score90% certainty of censorship
Detection TimeJanuary 1, 2023
Corroborating Evidence (92)
Evidence collected from multiple independent sources. Upstream claims shown in quotes are not Voidly assertions.
OONIOpen Observatory of Network Interference92 records
block
"Post-protest continued blocks"— OONI report
Signal value: 0.99
Jan 18, 2023
View source →block
"Post-protest continued blocks"— OONI report
Signal value: 0.98
Jan 17, 2023
View source →block
"Post-protest continued blocks"— OONI report
Signal value: 0.98
Jan 16, 2023
View source →block
"Post-protest continued blocks"— OONI report
Signal value: 0.98
Jan 15, 2023
View source →interference
"Web connectivity anomalies detected. 349 measurements with 97.7% anomaly rate."— OONI report
Signal value: 0.98
Jan 15, 2023
View source →+ 87 more OONI records
What we cannot say
- Who caused it — measurement data alone does not attribute this to any government, ISP, or other actor.
- Intent — anomalous or unreachable measurements indicate interference, not a stated motive or a deliberate-vs-incidental determination.
- Which networks — no specific ASN/ISP is identified for this incident.
- The mechanism — we cannot state whether this was DNS tampering, TLS/SNI reset, an HTTP blockpage, throttling, or an infrastructure outage.
- Sub-national scope — measurement is aggregated at the country level; we cannot localize to a province, city, or network segment.
- Independent corroboration — this rests on a single source; treat it as a single-source signal, not a multi-source confirmation.
Cite This Incident
Voidly Research. (2023). Confirmed: post-protest continued blocks [IR-2023-0006]. Voidly Global Censorship Index. https://voidly.ai/incident/IR-2023-0006
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