Active Incident
Confirmed: sustained censorship in Morocco (2026-06)
Morocco · June 2, 2026 · 11 days
OONI detected 10 days of elevated network interference averaging 62.4% anomaly rate.
Evidence
62%
Anomaly Rate
10
Measurements
77%
Confidence
What This Means
62% of 10 network tests from Morocco failed to reach these services. Global baseline failure rate is typically 1-3%. This 59+ percentage point difference strongly indicates intentional blocking.
How We Detected This
Data Sourceooni
ML ModelGradientBoosting v3.3 (LOCO median F1 0.87, honest across 127 countries)
Confidence Score77% certainty of censorship
Detection TimeJune 2, 2026
Corroborating Evidence (10)
Evidence collected from multiple independent sources. Upstream claims shown in quotes are not Voidly assertions.
OONIOpen Observatory of Network Interference10 records
middlebox-detection
"OONI http_invalid_request_line: 5/10 measurements anomalous (50.0%)"— OONI report
Signal value: 0.50
Jun 13, 2026
View source →middlebox-detection
"OONI http_invalid_request_line: 5/9 measurements anomalous (55.6%)"— OONI report
Signal value: 0.56
Jun 12, 2026
View source →middlebox-detection
"OONI http_invalid_request_line: 6/6 measurements anomalous (100.0%)"— OONI report
Signal value: 1.00
Jun 12, 2026
View source →middlebox-detection
"OONI http_invalid_request_line: 4/8 measurements anomalous (50.0%)"— OONI report
Signal value: 0.50
Jun 10, 2026
View source →middlebox-detection
"OONI http_invalid_request_line: 5/9 measurements anomalous (55.6%)"— OONI report
Signal value: 0.56
Jun 9, 2026
View source →+ 5 more OONI records
What we cannot say
- Who caused it — measurement data alone does not attribute this to any government, ISP, or other actor.
- Intent — anomalous or unreachable measurements indicate interference, not a stated motive or a deliberate-vs-incidental determination.
- Which networks — no specific ASN/ISP is identified for this incident.
- The mechanism — we cannot state whether this was DNS tampering, TLS/SNI reset, an HTTP blockpage, throttling, or an infrastructure outage.
- Sub-national scope — measurement is aggregated at the country level; we cannot localize to a province, city, or network segment.
- Independent corroboration — this rests on a single source; treat it as a single-source signal, not a multi-source confirmation.
Cite This Incident
Voidly Research. (2026). Confirmed: sustained censorship in Morocco (2026-06) [MA-2026-0223]. Voidly Global Censorship Index. https://voidly.ai/incident/MA-2026-0223
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