Africa / Northern Africa · LY
A closer look at internet access.
The score, the signals, the source.
30-day index score
9/100
A dated sample-based score. Higher values indicate more interference in the index model.
Snapshot fetched
Editorial context
Available source records for Libya are shown with their dates and measurement limits. An absent score does not imply unrestricted internet access.
This context is curated and undated. The trend is an editorial label, not a computed recent movement.
Internet freedom varies. Use Voidly to ensure unrestricted access.
Editorial text is preserved as source context. Product recommendations do not guarantee unrestricted access. The source tier may differ from the measured score because the two have different definitions.
Score window: 30 days. Snapshot fetched . Content first seen . Upstream serve-time . These timestamps do not date the all-time OONI observations.
All-time measurements accumulate from an older source file without an observation window or timestamp. The all-time blocked ratio is not the confidence-shrunk score. Zero counts and absent fields are kept distinct.
All-time measurement archive
No collection date or complete-country coverage claim is attached to this archive. Protocol fields can be incomplete and need not sum to the historical total.
Country incident records
A verified empty query is different from a failed request. It does not establish unrestricted access.
Statuses come from each record; “active” is not inferred from severity or an absent end date. Incident confidence is a source field, not independent certainty that censorship occurred.
No source mentions can be counted from the returned records.
This is the source mix in the latest returned incident sample, not independent corroboration of the country score. A record can name multiple sources; the counts can overlap.
Dataset version: unavailable. Malformed rows omitted: 0. All readable returned records appear above; each links to its complete evidence and citation page.
Measurement context
An anomaly is a measurement result requiring interpretation. These country API fields use a different basis from the dated, confidence-shrunk index score.
Names may be tests or services. Inclusion alone does not establish complete blocking.
Source generated: . This is a source timestamp, not proof that every underlying observation is current.
{
"@context": "https://schema.org",
"@type": "Country",
"name": "Libya",
"identifier": "LY",
"url": "https://voidly.ai/censorship-index/ly",
"additionalProperty": [
{
"@type": "PropertyValue",
"name": "Censorship Score",
"value": 7,
"description": "0-100 scale where 100 = total internet censorship"
},
{
"@type": "PropertyValue",
"name": "Anomaly Rate",
"value": 0.06776556776556776
},
{
"@type": "PropertyValue",
"name": "Measurement Count",
"value": 1092
}
],
"data": {
"country": "LY",
"name": "Libya",
"flag": "🇱🇾",
"region": "Africa",
"timestamp": "2026-10-03T17:44:53.720Z",
"status": "free",
"score": 7,
"categoryScores": {},
"blockedSites": [],
"affectedServices": [
"WhatsApp",
"Telegram"
],
"voidlyProbes": {
"total": 0,
"successful": 0,
"blocked": 0
},
"ooni": {
"status": "normal",
"anomalyRate": 0.06776556776556776,
"confirmedRate": 0,
"measurementCount": 1092,
"affectedServices": [
"WhatsApp",
"Telegram"
],
"lastUpdated": "2026-10-03T15:16:08.661Z"
},
"activeIncidents": []
},
"dataSource": "live_ooni",
"source": "Voidly Global Censorship Index",
"lastUpdated": "2026-10-03T17:44:54.059Z"
}Quality measures evidence confidence, not censorship probability. A small or absent sample cannot establish country-wide access. Quality generated: Date unavailable.
Quality sourceCountry-origin probe records: Unavailable. Flagged in that sample: Unavailable (Unavailable).
Global core + community active nodes: Unavailable. Core active nodes: Unavailable. Global probes in the last 24 hours: Unavailable. Network source updated: Date unavailable.
Global infrastructure totals do not prove that this country was tested from every location. A node’s reported status and country reflect network infrastructure, not national internet freedom.
No country-origin nodes were returned in this network response.
Model outlook
7-day event probability
Unavailable
A censorship or connectivity event within seven days of the model’s as-of date, relative to the country’s baseline. It does not predict an exact shutdown date or measure standing freedom.
Model: fallback
Model as-of date: Date unavailable
The model does not report coverage for this country.
Source generated: . This is a source timestamp, not proof that every underlying observation is current.
{
"country": "LY",
"country_name": "LY",
"generated_at": "2026-10-03T17:45:01.547Z",
"forecast": [
{
"day": 0,
"date": "2026-10-03",
"risk": 0.2,
"drivers": []
},
{
"day": 1,
"date": "2026-10-04",
"risk": 0.228,
"drivers": []
},
{
"day": 2,
"date": "2026-10-05",
"risk": 0.246,
"drivers": []
},
{
"day": 3,
"date": "2026-10-06",
"risk": 0.212,
"drivers": []
},
{
"day": 4,
"date": "2026-10-07",
"risk": 0.218,
"drivers": []
},
{
"day": 5,
"date": "2026-10-08",
"risk": 0.217,
"drivers": []
},
{
"day": 6,
"date": "2026-10-09",
"risk": 0.231,
"drivers": []
},
{
"day": 7,
"date": "2026-10-10",
"risk": 0.25,
"drivers": []
}
],
"summary": {
"max_risk": 0.25,
"max_risk_day": 7,
"avg_risk": 0.225,
"key_drivers": []
},
"model_version": "fallback",
"confidence": 0.5
}The returned daily shape belongs to legacy v1. It is not independently validated and does not describe the honest 7-day headline model above. Its peak day, fixed confidence and interval must not be attached to that headline.
| Date | Legacy value | Source drivers |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-03 | 20.0% | |
| 2026-10-04 | 22.8% | |
| 2026-10-05 | 24.6% | |
| 2026-10-06 | 21.2% | |
| 2026-10-07 | 21.8% | |
| 2026-10-08 | 21.7% | |
| 2026-10-09 | 23.1% | |
| 2026-10-10 | 25.0% |
Original display confidence field: 50.0%. The source describes this as fixed in-sample model confidence, not calibrated per-forecast certainty.
Separate multi-horizon model. Each mark is the point estimate; its bar is the source’s 90% conformal interval.
Covered multi-horizon estimates are unavailable for this country. No fallback probabilities are substituted.
Per-horizon breakdownSource generated: Date unavailable. This is a source timestamp, not proof that every underlying observation is current.
Model evaluation and labels differ. Honest 7-day model · Multi-horizon evaluation. An API response date is not the date of the underlying training data.
Additional signals
Each source answers a different question. Missing signals stay visible.
Unavailable
Separate from the index score. A weighted signal composite; sparse evidence can pull it toward zero.
Source freshness is unknown.
Date unavailable
Score methodSource generated: Date unavailable. This is a source timestamp, not proof that every underlying observation is current.
Unavailable
Scenario: a critical censorship incident in Libya. This is not a timer for an existing incident.
Promotion status unavailable.
Model trained: Date unavailable. Censoring in training data: Unavailable.
Source generated: Date unavailable. This is a source timestamp, not proof that every underlying observation is current.
This read-only inference endpoint requires a POST request:
POST https://api.voidly.ai/v1/forecast/duration
Content-Type: application/json
{
"country": "LY",
"severity": "critical",
"incident_type": "censorship"
}LY is in the active-triggers set for the current window and is excluded from the follower watchlist.
Trigger attribution is probabilistic, not causal. Noisy-OR aggregation can overstate risk when triggers share a cause.
Source generated: . This is a source timestamp, not proof that every underlying observation is current.
{
"active_triggers": [
{
"country": "AE",
"trigger_date": "2026-10-02T00:00:00"
},
{
"country": "AZ",
"trigger_date": "2026-10-02T00:00:00"
},
{
"country": "BY",
"trigger_date": "2026-10-02T00:00:00"
},
{
"country": "CN",
"trigger_date": "2026-10-02T00:00:00"
},
{
"country": "CU",
"trigger_date": "2026-10-02T00:00:00"
},
{
"country": "EG",
"trigger_date": "2026-10-02T00:00:00"
},
{
"country": "ET",
"trigger_date": "2026-10-02T00:00:00"
},
{
"country": "IR",
"trigger_date": "2026-10-02T00:00:00"
},
{
"country": "KH",
"trigger_date": "2026-10-02T00:00:00"
},
{
"country": "LB",
"trigger_date": "2026-10-02T00:00:00"
},
{
"country": "LY",
"trigger_date": "2026-10-02T00:00:00"
},
{
"country": "MM",
"trigger_date": "2026-10-02T00:00:00"
},
{
"country": "NG",
"trigger_date": "2026-10-02T00:00:00"
},
{
"country": "OM",
"trigger_date": "2026-10-02T00:00:00"
},
{
"country": "PK",
"trigger_date": "2026-10-02T00:00:00"
},
{
"country": "RS",
"trigger_date": "2026-10-02T00:00:00"
},
{
"country": "RU",
"trigger_date": "2026-10-02T00:00:00"
},
{
"country": "SN",
"trigger_date": "2026-10-02T00:00:00"
},
{
"country": "TN",
"trigger_date": "2026-10-02T00:00:00"
},
{
"country": "TZ",
"trigger_date": "2026-10-02T00:00:00"
},
{
"country": "UG",
"trigger_date": "2026-10-02T00:00:00"
},
{
"country": "VN",
"trigger_date": "2026-10-02T00:00:00"
}
],
"country": "LY",
"generated_at": "2026-10-03T12:17:03.942397+00:00",
"honest_caveats": [
"Inherits contagion-chain v1 model uncertainty (primary horizon AUC ~0.67).",
"24-48h is a TIGHT window. Most observed contagion patterns are 3-7d. This endpoint uses the shortest supported horizon (3d) as the closest proxy.",
"A country on the watchlist does NOT mean it WILL block. The score is a relative ranking; absolute calibration of the underlying pairwise classifier is moderate (Brier ~0.14 at 3d).",
"Trigger attribution is probabilistic (per-pair model output), not causal. Two countries spiking around the same time can also reflect shared upstream outages, regional politics, or coincidence.",
"Noisy-OR aggregation assumes triggers act independently — this overestimates risk when multiple triggers share an underlying driver.",
"Base-rate adjustment subtracts (base_daily * horizon) to discount countries that block every day anyway. This is a heuristic, not a matched counterfactual.",
"With zero active triggers in the last 48h, watchlist is empty by design."
],
"message": "LY is in the active-triggers set for the current window and is excluded from the follower watchlist.",
"status": "is_active_trigger"
}Similarity of measured blocking patterns, not governments or intent. Sparse feature coverage lowers confidence.
Source generated: . This is a source timestamp, not proof that every underlying observation is current.
Similarity here is BEHAVIORAL, not political. Two countries are near each other because they BLOCK in similar ways — comparable method mix, target categories and temporal shape — which does NOT imply comparable governments, laws or intent. A stable democracy with seasonal sports-piracy blocks can sit near an authoritarian state if their measured blocking footprints rhyme. Feature vectors are SPARSE for low-coverage countries (flagged sparse=true, <3 of 5 behavioral feature families populated) — their neighbors are dominated by regime/continent/cohort one-hots and should be read with low confidence. The 2D graph projection (UMAP or PCA) compresses a 32-dimensional space to 2 and loses information — use the cosine `neighbors` list, not pixel distance in the projection, for any quantitative claim.
{
"country": "LY",
"generated_at": "2026-09-28T05:10:10.998506+00:00",
"honest_caveat": "Similarity here is BEHAVIORAL, not political. Two countries are near each other because they BLOCK in similar ways — comparable method mix, target categories and temporal shape — which does NOT imply comparable governments, laws or intent. A stable democracy with seasonal sports-piracy blocks can sit near an authoritarian state if their measured blocking footprints rhyme. Feature vectors are SPARSE for low-coverage countries (flagged sparse=true, <3 of 5 behavioral feature families populated) — their neighbors are dominated by regime/continent/cohort one-hots and should be read with low confidence. The 2D graph projection (UMAP or PCA) compresses a 32-dimensional space to 2 and loses information — use the cosine `neighbors` list, not pixel distance in the projection, for any quantitative claim.",
"method": "standardized-cosine + pca",
"nearest": [
{
"continent": "Africa",
"country": "DZ",
"risk_tier": 3,
"similarity": 0.6981,
"sparse": false
},
{
"continent": "Africa",
"country": "SD",
"risk_tier": 3,
"similarity": 0.6587,
"sparse": false
},
{
"continent": "Africa",
"country": "CD",
"risk_tier": 3,
"similarity": 0.6441,
"sparse": false
},
{
"continent": "Africa",
"country": "TN",
"risk_tier": 3,
"similarity": 0.6065,
"sparse": false
},
{
"continent": "Africa",
"country": "ZW",
"risk_tier": 3,
"similarity": 0.6028,
"sparse": false
},
{
"continent": "Asia",
"country": "YE",
"risk_tier": 3,
"similarity": 0.577,
"sparse": false
},
{
"continent": "Africa",
"country": "UG",
"risk_tier": 3,
"similarity": 0.4705,
"sparse": false
},
{
"continent": "Africa",
"country": "SN",
"risk_tier": 3,
"similarity": 0.4451,
"sparse": false
},
{
"continent": "Africa",
"country": "NG",
"risk_tier": 4,
"similarity": 0.4119,
"sparse": false
},
{
"continent": "Africa",
"country": "CM",
"risk_tier": 3,
"similarity": 0.3811,
"sparse": false
}
],
"query_meta": {
"continent": "Africa",
"country": "LY",
"dtw_cohort": 3,
"evidence_count": 2364,
"feature_families_present": 3,
"feature_families_total": 5,
"risk_tier": 3,
"sparse": false
},
"version": "v1"
}Grade distribution unavailable.
Grades are source rubric categories. They do not independently establish deliberate blocking.
Grading rubricSource generated: Date unavailable. This is a source timestamp, not proof that every underlying observation is current.
No sufficiently covered headline recommendation is available.
Full measurement tableSource generated: Date unavailable. This is a source timestamp, not proof that every underlying observation is current.
Network variation
Network-level records add detail that a country score cannot show.
ISP source unavailable. This does not establish an absence of blocking.
Returned rows: unavailable; source ISP count: Unavailable. Counts and percentages apply to the returned measurement sample.
Source generated: Date unavailable. This is a source timestamp, not proof that every underlying observation is current.
Editorial service list
Undated editorial context. Check current evidence before treating a service as blocked.
Check a specific domainCountry guidance
The original country recommendations are preserved below. They are undated guidance, not a guarantee of access or safety.
Questions, answered
The dated 30-day index score is 9/100. That describes the source sample, not every person, network or domain in Libya.
Internet freedom varies. Use Voidly to ensure unrestricted access.
Use the recent records and their original sources to investigate a particular restriction. Disruption alone does not establish intentional censorship.
The editorial list names: Varies by country. It is undated context, not a current availability check.
Results can differ between networks, measurement times and targets. Country incident records and the country API preserve source details.
Original snapshot rank: #14. Editorial risk tier: High. Editorial trend: stable. The tier and trend are curated context; they are not a measured change between recent dates.
The index includes a dated score window and a separate all-time measurement corpus. Compare like-for-like windows and inspect sample coverage before drawing a national comparison. Compare the index.
The pipeline can record DNS interference, TCP resets, HTTP block pages, TLS/SNI failures and network-level outages. This list describes possible mechanisms; it does not claim every mechanism was observed in Libya.
Each incident and ISP record below retains its reported mechanism and evidence. Inspect the country evidence query before attributing a failure to deliberate blocking.
The index score snapshot was fetched . Its source serve-time can advance without changes in the underlying scores. The accumulating historical OONI file has no dated observation window.
Current country data, incidents, network state and models have independent source dates. The page requested those sources . It does not continuously refresh. Missing, stale and uncovered responses remain labeled.
Subscribe to source feedsOpen the accessibility checker. For a source query, use the country code with the domain you are investigating:
GET https://api.voidly.ai/v1/accessibility/check?domain=twitter.com&country=LY MCP server: npx @voidly/mcp-server Tool: check_domain_blocked Arguments: domain="twitter.com", country="LY" CLI: npx @voidly/cli check twitter.com LY
Inspect the returned timestamp, measurement coverage and method. A sampled result is not a guarantee for every user. API documentation · MCP tools.
Results depend on local networks and the transport used. The source’s complete country guidance is preserved in the recommendations section. Voidly’s current product details belong on the VPN page; a measured probe result is not a safety or success guarantee.
Use the canonical country URL, https://voidly.ai/ly, with your access date and the date of any source snapshot you quote. The citation below supports plain text and BibTeX copy/download. A model generation or page access date is not a publication date.
Voidly-original analysis is CC BY 4.0. Upstream records keep their own attribution and licenses.
Open evidence
Voidly Research. (n.d.). Libya Internet Censorship Profile. https://voidly.ai/ly (accessed 2026-10-03).
Citations use the public /ly URL. Access date is not publication date. Cite the individual source, observation time and model version when using a number.
Voidly-original analysis and annotations are CC BY 4.0. Upstream OONI, IODA and Censored Planet records retain their own licenses. Read and attribute the underlying evidence.