Voidly
Data

Americas / South America · VE

Venezuela.

A closer look at internet access.
The score, the signals, the source.

7-day index score

14/100

A dated sample-based score. Higher values indicate more interference in the index model.

Measurements in window
560,690
Original snapshot rank
#8

Snapshot fetched

Editorial context

Understand the backdrop.

Venezuela blocks opposition news sites and social media during political unrest. Internet shutdowns occur during protests.

High editorial tierstable editorial trend

This context is curated and undated. The trend is an editorial label, not a computed recent movement.

Country narrative, score basis and historical source

Venezuela blocks opposition news sites and social media during political unrest. Internet shutdowns occur during protests.

Editorial text is preserved as source context. Product recommendations do not guarantee unrestricted access. The source tier may differ from the measured score because the two have different definitions.

Score window: 7 days. Snapshot fetched . Content first seen . Upstream serve-time . These timestamps do not date the all-time OONI observations.

All-time measurements accumulate from an older source file without an observation window or timestamp. The all-time blocked ratio is not the confidence-shrunk score. Zero counts and absent fields are kept distinct.

All-time measurement archive

Accumulated measurements
947,114
Flagged blocked in archive
169,642
All-time blocked / total
17.9%
Stored protocol counts · separate historical fields
Web919,453
Telegram13,804
WhatsApp13,857

No collection date or complete-country coverage claim is attached to this archive. Protocol fields can be incomplete and need not sum to the historical total.

Country incident records

Start with an observation.

All country records
Incident source unavailableGenerated Date unavailable

The incident source could not be read.

Reload to retry or open the source query. Missing data is not a zero incident count.

Statuses come from each record; “active” is not inferred from severity or an absent end date. Incident confidence is a source field, not independent certainty that censorship occurred.

Evidence sources, query scope and dates

No source mentions can be counted from the returned records.

This is the source mix in the latest returned incident sample, not independent corroboration of the country score. A record can name multiple sources; the counts can overlap.

Dataset version: unavailable. Malformed rows omitted: unavailable. All readable returned records appear above; each links to its complete evidence and citation page.

Measurement context

Know what is observed.

Quality methods

Current country response

Source branch
OONI response
OONI measurements
572,785
Sample anomaly rate
13.1%
Source confirmed-rate field
0.0%
Measurement source updated

An anomaly is a measurement result requiring interpretation. These country API fields use a different basis from the dated, confidence-shrunk index score.

Country API basis and complete response

Source generated: . This is a source timestamp, not proof that every underlying observation is current.

Open the source response

Complete returned record
{
  "@context": "https://schema.org",
  "@type": "Country",
  "name": "Venezuela",
  "identifier": "VE",
  "url": "https://voidly.ai/censorship-index/ve",
  "additionalProperty": [
    {
      "@type": "PropertyValue",
      "name": "Censorship Score",
      "value": 13,
      "description": "0-100 scale where 100 = total internet censorship"
    },
    {
      "@type": "PropertyValue",
      "name": "Anomaly Rate",
      "value": 0.1305201777281179
    },
    {
      "@type": "PropertyValue",
      "name": "Measurement Count",
      "value": 572785
    }
  ],
  "data": {
    "country": "VE",
    "name": "Venezuela",
    "flag": "🇻🇪",
    "region": "Americas",
    "timestamp": "2026-11-18T04:24:43.898Z",
    "status": "low",
    "score": 13,
    "categoryScores": {},
    "blockedSites": [],
    "affectedServices": [],
    "voidlyProbes": {
      "total": 0,
      "successful": 0,
      "blocked": 0
    },
    "ooni": {
      "status": "normal",
      "anomalyRate": 0.1305201777281179,
      "confirmedRate": 0.0000017458557748544394,
      "measurementCount": 572785,
      "affectedServices": [],
      "lastUpdated": "2026-11-18T02:30:05.000Z"
    },
    "activeIncidents": []
  },
  "dataSource": "live_ooni",
  "source": "Voidly Global Censorship Index",
  "lastUpdated": "2026-11-18T04:25:56.988Z"
}

Country measurement quality

Measurement confidence
84/100 · high
30-day source measurements
2,200
Distinct measured domains
523
Reported source count
3
Hours since measured
5.3

Quality measures evidence confidence, not censorship probability. A small or absent sample cannot establish country-wide access. Quality generated: .

Quality source
Country-origin probes and global network status

Probe network statistics are not published while we review what they reveal. No country-origin probe count is shown.

Probe aggregates, per-probe and operator listings are temporarily withheld to protect volunteer operators. Historical country-origin records, if returned, do not establish current or whole-country coverage.

Model outlook

Read the horizon.

Drivers & similar episodes

7-day event probability

Unavailable

A censorship or connectivity event within seven days of the model’s as-of date, relative to the country’s baseline. It does not predict an exact shutdown date or measure standing freedom.

Model: Unavailable
Model as-of date: Date unavailable

7-day model, legacy trajectory and full source

Source generated: Date unavailable. This is a source timestamp, not proof that every underlying observation is current.

Open the source response

Three horizons. Interval unvalidated.

Separate multi-horizon model. Each mark is a model score. The former residual bands lack validated 90% coverage and are withheld.

Covered multi-horizon estimates are unavailable for this country. No fallback probabilities are substituted.

Per-horizon breakdown
Multi-horizon limitations, features and source

Source generated: Date unavailable. This is a source timestamp, not proof that every underlying observation is current.

Open the source response

Model evaluation and labels differ. Honest 7-day model · Multi-horizon evaluation. An API response date is not the date of the underlying training data.

Additional signals

More context. Separate models.

Model changelog

Each source answers a different question. Missing signals stay visible.

Partial composite sum

39.13 / 100

Separate from the index score. A weighted signal composite; sparse evidence can pull it toward zero.

Input status unverified. Not a full Voidly Score.

Source marks its age within the stated freshness limit.

Score method
Source, dates and limitations

Source generated: . This is a source timestamp, not proof that every underlying observation is current.

  • Weights are hand-tuned, not learned end-to-end.
  • The seven components are correlated — the weighted sum is not a pure information-theoretic average.
  • 'Intensity' is editorial framing. The metric is a censorship-risk-weighted average across live signals, not a direct user-facing measurement.
  • Mobile-blocking skew is approximated from OONI test_name= URL params and gated to countries with at least 10 probes in the last 7 days.
  • The first 3 days after rollout the smoothed series equals the raw score (cold start); deltas stabilize after that.
  • Countries with sparse data (low OONI coverage, no recent incidents, no DBSCAN window) will float near 0 not because they are uncensored but because the signals collapse there.

Open the source response

Complete returned record
{
  "age_hours": 23.85,
  "components_normalized": {
    "agreement": 0.7641,
    "classifier": 0.0843,
    "dbscan": 0.5437,
    "domain_div": 0.6144,
    "forecast": 0.3361,
    "incident_rate": 0,
    "mobile_skew": 0.0212
  },
  "components_points": {
    "agreement": 9.55,
    "classifier": 3.16,
    "dbscan": 10.19,
    "domain_div": 7.68,
    "incident_rate": 0,
    "mobile_skew": 0.13
  },
  "country": "VE",
  "country_name": "Venezuela",
  "delta_vs_yesterday": -8.42,
  "ema_status": "warm",
  "generated_at": "2026-11-17T04:35:10.098932+00:00",
  "honest_caveats": [
    "Weights are hand-tuned, not learned end-to-end.",
    "The seven components are correlated — the weighted sum is not a pure information-theoretic average.",
    "'Intensity' is editorial framing. The metric is a censorship-risk-weighted average across live signals, not a direct user-facing measurement.",
    "Mobile-blocking skew is approximated from OONI test_name= URL params and gated to countries with at least 10 probes in the last 7 days.",
    "The first 3 days after rollout the smoothed series equals the raw score (cold start); deltas stabilize after that.",
    "Countries with sparse data (low OONI coverage, no recent incidents, no DBSCAN window) will float near 0 not because they are uncensored but because the signals collapse there."
  ],
  "interpretation": "smoothed_score is what to put in a headline; raw_score is today's component sum before EMA. delta_vs_yesterday is the movement (positive = censorship intensifying).",
  "previous_raw_score": 53.07,
  "previous_smoothed_score": 47.55,
  "raw_score": 30.72,
  "raw_signals": {
    "agreement_n_sources": null,
    "agreement_rate_2plus": 0.7641,
    "classifier_date": null,
    "classifier_label": 0,
    "classifier_probability": 0.0843,
    "classifier_threshold": 0.7243,
    "classifier_version": "v3.3",
    "dbscan_anomaly_score_raw": 1.6311,
    "dbscan_date": "2026-11-16",
    "dbscan_is_anomaly": true,
    "forecast_key_drivers": [],
    "forecast_max_day": 6,
    "forecast_max_risk": 0.3361,
    "incidents_24h_censorship": 0,
    "incidents_24h_disruption": 0,
    "incidents_24h_weighted": 0,
    "mobile_skew": 0.0106,
    "ooni_mobile_probes_7d": 6,
    "ooni_probes_7d": 566,
    "unique_blocked_domains_30d": 25
  },
  "run_date": "2026-11-17",
  "schema": "voidly-score-country/v1",
  "sidecar_age_hr": 23.85,
  "smoothed_score": 39.13,
  "stale": false,
  "stale_after_hours": 26,
  "stale_field_note": "`stale` is three-valued: true / false / \"unknown\". \"unknown\" means the age could not be determined (missing or unparseable timestamp) and is NOT an assertion of freshness -- it is truthy on purpose so that a consumer testing the field falls to the cautious side. Check `stale_known` for a strict boolean and `stale_reason` for how the verdict was reached.",
  "stale_known": true,
  "stale_reason": "generated_at is 23.85h old, within the 26.00h threshold.",
  "weights": {
    "agreement": 0.125,
    "classifier": 0.375,
    "dbscan": 0.1875,
    "domain_div": 0.125,
    "incident_rate": 0.125,
    "mobile_skew": 0.0625
  }
}

Conditional incident duration

5 median days

Scenario: a critical censorship incident in Venezuela. This is not a timer for an existing incident.

Source interquartile range: 3–5 days.

Exploratory · source model is below its promotion threshold.

Model trained: . Censoring in training data: 78.4%.

Duration assumptions, request and source

Source generated: Date unavailable. This is a source timestamp, not proof that every underlying observation is current.

  • model below promote floor (c=0.55, n=343) — treat as exploratory
  • censoring rate in training set: 78%

This read-only inference endpoint requires a POST request:

POST https://api.voidly.ai/v1/forecast/duration
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "country": "VE",
  "severity": "critical",
  "incident_type": "censorship"
}

API documentation

Complete returned record
{
  "country": "VE",
  "features_used": {
    "continent_Africa": 0,
    "continent_Americas": 1,
    "continent_Asia": 0,
    "continent_Europe": 0,
    "continent_Oceania": 0,
    "country_risk_tier": 2,
    "first_seen_month": 11,
    "first_seen_year": 2026,
    "prior_shutdowns_count_24mo": 167,
    "severity_critical": 1,
    "severity_warning": 0,
    "type_censorship": 1,
    "type_mixed": 0
  },
  "honest_caveats": [
    "model below promote floor (c=0.55, n=343) — treat as exploratory",
    "censoring rate in training set: 78%"
  ],
  "incident_type": "censorship",
  "iqr_days": 2,
  "median_days": 5,
  "median_hours": 120,
  "model": {
    "censoring_rate": 0.7842565597667639,
    "class": "RandomSurvivalForest",
    "feature_names": [
      "country_risk_tier",
      "first_seen_year",
      "first_seen_month",
      "prior_shutdowns_count_24mo",
      "continent_Africa",
      "continent_Americas",
      "continent_Asia",
      "continent_Europe",
      "continent_Oceania",
      "severity_critical",
      "severity_warning",
      "type_censorship",
      "type_mixed"
    ],
    "name": "shutdown_duration_rsf_v1",
    "trained_at": "2026-05-21T12:01:30.451711Z"
  },
  "model_c_index": 0.5455,
  "n_training_samples": 343,
  "p25_hours": 72,
  "p75_hours": 120,
  "promoted": false,
  "severity": "critical",
  "survival_curve_summary": [
    {
      "hours": 48,
      "survival_prob": 0.9
    },
    {
      "hours": 72,
      "survival_prob": 0.75
    },
    {
      "hours": 120,
      "survival_prob": 0.5
    },
    {
      "hours": 120,
      "survival_prob": 0.25
    },
    {
      "hours": 8832,
      "survival_prob": 0.1
    }
  ]
}

Contagion follow-risk

0.0% source ranking score

Trigger attribution is probabilistic, not causal. Noisy-OR aggregation can overstate risk when triggers share a cause.

Horizon: 3 days. Source baseline: 47.3%.

Source, dates and limitations

Source generated: . This is a source timestamp, not proof that every underlying observation is current.

  • Inherits contagion-chain v1 model uncertainty (primary horizon AUC ~0.67).
  • 24-48h is a TIGHT window. Most observed contagion patterns are 3-7d. This endpoint uses the shortest supported horizon (3d) as the closest proxy.
  • A country on the watchlist does NOT mean it WILL block. The score is a relative ranking; absolute calibration of the underlying pairwise classifier is moderate (Brier ~0.14 at 3d).
  • Trigger attribution is probabilistic (per-pair model output), not causal. Two countries spiking around the same time can also reflect shared upstream outages, regional politics, or coincidence.
  • Noisy-OR aggregation assumes triggers act independently — this overestimates risk when multiple triggers share an underlying driver.
  • Base-rate adjustment subtracts (base_daily * horizon) to discount countries that block every day anyway. This is a heuristic, not a matched counterfactual.
  • With zero active triggers in the last 48h, watchlist is empty by design.

Open the source response

Complete returned record
{
  "attribution": [
    {
      "p_follow_3d": 0.0441,
      "pair_coevents_365d": 49,
      "same_auth_cluster": false,
      "same_region": false,
      "trigger": "IQ",
      "trigger_date": "2026-11-16T10:50:00"
    },
    {
      "p_follow_3d": 0.0433,
      "pair_coevents_365d": 111,
      "same_auth_cluster": false,
      "same_region": false,
      "trigger": "BD",
      "trigger_date": "2026-11-16T04:25:00"
    },
    {
      "p_follow_3d": 0.0142,
      "pair_coevents_365d": 236,
      "same_auth_cluster": true,
      "same_region": false,
      "trigger": "AZ",
      "trigger_date": "2026-11-16T03:05:00"
    }
  ],
  "base_prior_3d": 0.4734,
  "base_rate_daily": 0.15779,
  "country": "VE",
  "follower_events_30d": 8,
  "generated_at": "2026-11-18T00:17:04.892101+00:00",
  "honest_caveats": [
    "Inherits contagion-chain v1 model uncertainty (primary horizon AUC ~0.67).",
    "24-48h is a TIGHT window. Most observed contagion patterns are 3-7d. This endpoint uses the shortest supported horizon (3d) as the closest proxy.",
    "A country on the watchlist does NOT mean it WILL block. The score is a relative ranking; absolute calibration of the underlying pairwise classifier is moderate (Brier ~0.14 at 3d).",
    "Trigger attribution is probabilistic (per-pair model output), not causal. Two countries spiking around the same time can also reflect shared upstream outages, regional politics, or coincidence.",
    "Noisy-OR aggregation assumes triggers act independently — this overestimates risk when multiple triggers share an underlying driver.",
    "Base-rate adjustment subtracts (base_daily * horizon) to discount countries that block every day anyway. This is a heuristic, not a matched counterfactual.",
    "With zero active triggers in the last 48h, watchlist is empty by design."
  ],
  "horizon_days": 3,
  "n_active_triggers": 3,
  "noisy_or": 0.0985,
  "rank": 31,
  "score": 0,
  "status": "on_watchlist",
  "trigger_window_hours": 48,
  "underlying_model": {
    "name": "contagion-chain-v1 (pairwise XGBoost)",
    "primary_horizon_auc_h7": 0.6696949571962517,
    "sidecar": "[internal path]"
  }
}

Behavioral neighbors

Similarity of measured blocking patterns, not governments or intent. Sparse feature coverage lowers confidence.

Source, dates and limitations

Source generated: . This is a source timestamp, not proof that every underlying observation is current.

Similarity here is BEHAVIORAL, not political. Two countries are near each other because they BLOCK in similar ways — comparable method mix, target categories and temporal shape — which does NOT imply comparable governments, laws or intent. A stable democracy with seasonal sports-piracy blocks can sit near an authoritarian state if their measured blocking footprints rhyme. Feature vectors are SPARSE for low-coverage countries (flagged sparse=true, <3 of 5 behavioral feature families populated) — their neighbors are dominated by regime/continent/cohort one-hots and should be read with low confidence. The 2D graph projection (UMAP or PCA) compresses a 32-dimensional space to 2 and loses information — use the cosine `neighbors` list, not pixel distance in the projection, for any quantitative claim.

Open the source response

Complete returned record
{
  "country": "VE",
  "generated_at": "2026-11-16T05:10:44.489281+00:00",
  "honest_caveat": "Similarity here is BEHAVIORAL, not political. Two countries are near each other because they BLOCK in similar ways — comparable method mix, target categories and temporal shape — which does NOT imply comparable governments, laws or intent. A stable democracy with seasonal sports-piracy blocks can sit near an authoritarian state if their measured blocking footprints rhyme. Feature vectors are SPARSE for low-coverage countries (flagged sparse=true, <3 of 5 behavioral feature families populated) — their neighbors are dominated by regime/continent/cohort one-hots and should be read with low confidence. The 2D graph projection (UMAP or PCA) compresses a 32-dimensional space to 2 and loses information — use the cosine `neighbors` list, not pixel distance in the projection, for any quantitative claim.",
  "method": "standardized-cosine + pca",
  "nearest": [
    {
      "continent": "Asia",
      "country": "ID",
      "risk_tier": 3,
      "similarity": 0.6736,
      "sparse": false
    },
    {
      "continent": "Americas",
      "country": "PA",
      "risk_tier": 3,
      "similarity": 0.6443,
      "sparse": false
    },
    {
      "continent": "Europe",
      "country": "FR",
      "risk_tier": 5,
      "similarity": 0.4848,
      "sparse": false
    },
    {
      "continent": "Americas",
      "country": "CU",
      "risk_tier": 2,
      "similarity": 0.4456,
      "sparse": false
    },
    {
      "continent": "Asia",
      "country": "IQ",
      "risk_tier": 2,
      "similarity": 0.4241,
      "sparse": false
    },
    {
      "continent": "Asia",
      "country": "SY",
      "risk_tier": 1,
      "similarity": 0.4024,
      "sparse": false
    },
    {
      "continent": "Asia",
      "country": "QA",
      "risk_tier": 3,
      "similarity": 0.3523,
      "sparse": false
    },
    {
      "continent": "Asia",
      "country": "KZ",
      "risk_tier": 2,
      "similarity": 0.3273,
      "sparse": false
    },
    {
      "continent": "Asia",
      "country": "SA",
      "risk_tier": 2,
      "similarity": 0.3232,
      "sparse": false
    },
    {
      "continent": "Europe",
      "country": "RU",
      "risk_tier": 2,
      "similarity": 0.3231,
      "sparse": false
    }
  ],
  "query_meta": {
    "continent": "Americas",
    "country": "VE",
    "dtw_cohort": 2,
    "evidence_count": 13737,
    "feature_families_present": 5,
    "feature_families_total": 5,
    "risk_tier": 2,
    "sparse": false
  },
  "version": "v1"
}

Evidence grade distribution

A: 162B: 126C: 58F: 1

Grades are source rubric categories. They do not independently establish deliberate blocking.

Grading rubric
Source, dates and limitations

Source generated: Date unavailable. This is a source timestamp, not proof that every underlying observation is current.

Open the source response

Complete returned record
{
  "distribution": {
    "A": 162,
    "B": 126,
    "C": 58,
    "F": 1
  },
  "filters": {
    "country": "VE",
    "incident_type": null
  },
  "rules": {
    "A": "else",
    "B": "n_sources >= 1 AND avg_confidence >= 0.7",
    "C": "n_sources >= 2 AND n_domains >= 3",
    "F": "duration_hours >= 24 AND n_sources >= 2"
  },
  "total": 350,
  "ungraded": 3
}

Measured circumvention results

Generic commercial VPN bootstrap

0.0% probe success · 42 probes · 30-day source window.

Probe success is an upper bound on real-user success. “Try first” is not a safety guarantee; results can become stale within hours.

Source verdict: blocked.

Required caveats, tool notes and complete results

Source generated: . This is a source timestamp, not proof that every underlying observation is current.

  • PROBE SUCCESS != REAL-USER SUCCESS. DPI vendors increasingly rate-limit real client traffic while letting OONI / Voidly synthetic measurement probes through. Success rates here are an UPPER BOUND on what a real user will see.
  • Recommendations can become stale within hours. Censorship adapts. If a try_first tool stops working, the next probe rotation (cron daily 06:00 UTC) will catch it but you will see it before we do.
  • 'Try first' is NOT 'safe'. It means 'highest measured success rate, highest probe confidence.' Operational security (unique device, throwaway account, no SIM, no DNS leak, etc.) is the USER's responsibility — none of that is captured here.
  • Domain-fronted tools (Snowflake, Lantern, Psiphon) are SYSTEMATICALLY UNDER-ESTIMATED. Bootstrap-domain probes do not measure the rotating tunnel endpoints those tools actually use.
  • Self-hosted WireGuard / OpenVPN on a private IP is INVISIBLE to OONI probes and is not represented here. If you have one, trust it over any commercial recommendation.
  • Tor rows roll up vanilla / obfs4 / Snowflake / Meek transports. Per-transport granularity needs raw OONI nettests, out of scope for v1.
  • DO NOT share this recommendation as a forum-shareable card without the caveat block. The do_not_share_card_without_caveats flag in the response is on by design.

Open the source response

Complete returned record
{
  "country_code": "VE",
  "coverage_note": "Every measured tool in VE fell into the AVOID tier (< 10% probe success at >= 0.50 confidence). The headline above is the least-bad row, NOT a working recommendation. Consider a self-hosted WireGuard / OpenVPN endpoint on a private IP (invisible to OONI), or a tool we do not measure (e.g. Cloudflare WARP, Outline, Snowflake-only Tor).",
  "do_not_share_card_without_caveats": true,
  "endpoints": {
    "info": "/v1/atlas/circumvention/info",
    "leaderboard": "/v1/atlas/evasion/leaderboard",
    "upstream_evasion_table": "/v1/atlas/evasion/VE"
  },
  "generated_at": "2026-11-17T06:00:13.920211+00:00",
  "headline_basis": "best-of-measured (none cleared try_first or fallback bar)",
  "headline_recommendation": {
    "category": "commercial-vpn-aggregate",
    "confidence": 0.99,
    "n_total_probes": 42,
    "rank_score": 0,
    "success_rate": 0,
    "tool_name": "Generic commercial VPN bootstrap",
    "tool_note": "Aggregate over ProtonVPN, ExpressVPN, Mullvad, VPN Gate. Hides per-vendor variation. Look at the per-tool rows to see which specific vendor passes if any.",
    "tool_slug": "generic-vpn",
    "verdict": "blocked"
  },
  "honest_caveats": [
    "PROBE SUCCESS != REAL-USER SUCCESS. DPI vendors increasingly rate-limit real client traffic while letting OONI / Voidly synthetic measurement probes through. Success rates here are an UPPER BOUND on what a real user will see.",
    "Recommendations can become stale within hours. Censorship adapts. If a try_first tool stops working, the next probe rotation (cron daily 06:00 UTC) will catch it but you will see it before we do.",
    "'Try first' is NOT 'safe'. It means 'highest measured success rate, highest probe confidence.' Operational security (unique device, throwaway account, no SIM, no DNS leak, etc.) is the USER's responsibility — none of that is captured here.",
    "Domain-fronted tools (Snowflake, Lantern, Psiphon) are SYSTEMATICALLY UNDER-ESTIMATED. Bootstrap-domain probes do not measure the rotating tunnel endpoints those tools actually use.",
    "Self-hosted WireGuard / OpenVPN on a private IP is INVISIBLE to OONI probes and is not represented here. If you have one, trust it over any commercial recommendation.",
    "Tor rows roll up vanilla / obfs4 / Snowflake / Meek transports. Per-transport granularity needs raw OONI nettests, out of scope for v1.",
    "DO NOT share this recommendation as a forum-shareable card without the caveat block. The do_not_share_card_without_caveats flag in the response is on by design."
  ],
  "informational_disclaimer": "This endpoint is INFORMATIONAL, not a safety guarantee. Probe success is an upper bound on real-user success. User assumes the risk of any tool selected from this ranking. 'Try first' does not mean 'safe' — it means 'highest measured success, highest probe confidence.'",
  "insufficient_coverage": false,
  "lookback_days": 30,
  "min_total_probes_floor": 100,
  "n_tools_measured": 4,
  "n_total_probes": 162,
  "rank_formula": "success_rate * sqrt(confidence) * recency_decay",
  "schema": "voidly-circumvention-recommendation/v1",
  "tier_definitions": {
    "avoid": {
      "description": "High-confidence measurements show <10% probe success. Very likely blocked. Listed for transparency — do not trust the bootstrap path.",
      "label": "Avoid",
      "max_success_rate": 0.1,
      "min_confidence": 0.7
    },
    "fallback": {
      "description": "Either partial measured success (30%+) OR not enough probes to be sure. Worth trying if the try_first tools fail — but expect lower reliability.",
      "label": "Fallback",
      "max_confidence_for_uncertain": 0.5,
      "min_success_rate_lower": 0.3
    },
    "try_first": {
      "description": "High measured success rate AND high probe confidence. Still informational only — DPI vendors increasingly block real clients while letting measurement probes pass, so success_rate is an upper bound.",
      "label": "Try first",
      "min_confidence": 0.7,
      "min_success_rate": 0.7
    }
  },
  "tiers": {
    "avoid": [
      {
        "category": "commercial-vpn-aggregate",
        "confidence": 0.99,
        "n_total_probes": 42,
        "rank_score": 0,
        "success_rate": 0,
        "tool_name": "Generic commercial VPN bootstrap",
        "tool_note": "Aggregate over ProtonVPN, ExpressVPN, Mullvad, VPN Gate. Hides per-vendor variation. Look at the per-tool rows to see which specific vendor passes if any.",
        "tool_slug": "generic-vpn",
        "verdict": "blocked"
      },
      {
        "category": "commercial-vpn",
        "confidence": 0.99,
        "n_total_probes": 42,
        "rank_score": 0,
        "success_rate": 0,
        "tool_name": "ProtonVPN",
        "tool_note": "Blocking protonvpn.com does NOT block all ProtonVPN tunnels. Individual WireGuard / OpenVPN endpoint IPs may stay reachable.",
        "tool_slug": "protonvpn",
        "verdict": "blocked"
      },
      {
        "category": "vpn-proxy",
        "confidence": 0.99,
        "n_total_probes": 43,
        "rank_score": 0,
        "success_rate": 0,
        "tool_name": "Psiphon",
        "tool_note": "Psiphon ships a bundled server list — even if psiphon.ca is blocked, the app can usually bootstrap from cached entries.",
        "tool_slug": "psiphon",
        "verdict": "blocked"
      },
      {
        "category": "p2p-circumvention",
        "confidence": 0.977,
        "n_total_probes": 35,
        "rank_score": 0,
        "success_rate": 0,
        "tool_name": "Lantern",
        "tool_note": "Lantern bootstraps from getlantern.org but rotates endpoints aggressively after that. Bootstrap-domain block does not mean ongoing-connection block.",
        "tool_slug": "lantern",
        "verdict": "blocked"
      }
    ],
    "fallback": [],
    "try_first": []
  },
  "tools_ranked": [
    {
      "block_rate": 1,
      "blocking_methods": {
        "dns-blocking": 7
      },
      "category": "commercial-vpn-aggregate",
      "confidence": 0.99,
      "confidence_band": "high",
      "domains_observed": [
        "protonvpn.com"
      ],
      "first_observed": "2026-10-25T00:00:00Z",
      "last_observed": "2026-11-15T00:00:00Z",
      "n_blocked_probes": 42,
      "n_successful_probes": 0,
      "n_total_probes": 42,
      "n_unique_asns": 1,
      "rank_score": 0,
      "recency_decay": 0.9625,
      "recency_decay_known": true,
      "recency_decay_note": null,
      "success_rate": 0,
      "tier": "avoid",
      "tool_name": "Generic commercial VPN bootstrap",
      "tool_note": "Aggregate over ProtonVPN, ExpressVPN, Mullvad, VPN Gate. Hides per-vendor variation. Look at the per-tool rows to see which specific vendor passes if any.",
      "tool_slug": "generic-vpn",
      "verdict": "blocked"
    },
    {
      "block_rate": 1,
      "blocking_methods": {
        "dns-blocking": 7
      },
      "category": "commercial-vpn",
      "confidence": 0.99,
      "confidence_band": "high",
      "domains_observed": [
        "protonvpn.com"
      ],
      "first_observed": "2026-10-25T00:00:00Z",
      "last_observed": "2026-11-15T00:00:00Z",
      "n_blocked_probes": 42,
      "n_successful_probes": 0,
      "n_total_probes": 42,
      "n_unique_asns": 1,
      "rank_score": 0,
      "recency_decay": 0.9625,
      "recency_decay_known": true,
      "recency_decay_note": null,
      "success_rate": 0,
      "tier": "avoid",
      "tool_name": "ProtonVPN",
      "tool_note": "Blocking protonvpn.com does NOT block all ProtonVPN tunnels. Individual WireGuard / OpenVPN endpoint IPs may stay reachable.",
      "tool_slug": "protonvpn",
      "verdict": "blocked"
    },
    {
      "block_rate": 1,
      "blocking_methods": {
        "dns-blocking": 7
      },
      "category": "vpn-proxy",
      "confidence": 0.99,
      "confidence_band": "high",
      "domains_observed": [
        "psiphon.ca"
      ],
      "first_observed": "2026-10-25T00:00:00Z",
      "last_observed": "2026-11-15T00:00:00Z",
      "n_blocked_probes": 43,
      "n_successful_probes": 0,
      "n_total_probes": 43,
      "n_unique_asns": 1,
      "rank_score": 0,
      "recency_decay": 0.9625,
      "recency_decay_known": true,
      "recency_decay_note": null,
      "success_rate": 0,
      "tier": "avoid",
      "tool_name": "Psiphon",
      "tool_note": "Psiphon ships a bundled server list — even if psiphon.ca is blocked, the app can usually bootstrap from cached entries.",
      "tool_slug": "psiphon",
      "verdict": "blocked"
    },
    {
      "block_rate": 1,
      "blocking_methods": {
        "dns-blocking": 7
      },
      "category": "p2p-circumvention",
      "confidence": 0.977,
      "confidence_band": "high",
      "domains_observed": [
        "getlantern.org"
      ],
      "first_observed": "2026-10-25T00:00:00Z",
      "last_observed": "2026-11-15T00:00:00Z",
      "n_blocked_probes": 35,
      "n_successful_probes": 0,
      "n_total_probes": 35,
      "n_unique_asns": 1,
      "rank_score": 0,
      "recency_decay": 0.9625,
      "recency_decay_known": true,
      "recency_decay_note": null,
      "success_rate": 0,
      "tier": "avoid",
      "tool_name": "Lantern",
      "tool_note": "Lantern bootstraps from getlantern.org but rotates endpoints aggressively after that. Bootstrap-domain block does not mean ongoing-connection block.",
      "tool_slug": "lantern",
      "verdict": "blocked"
    }
  ]
}

Network variation

Look inside the country.

Global ISP index

Under review: ISP block rates. Verdict: unknown. These verdicts counted CensoredPlanet rows and IODA outages as blocks, which Voidly no longer accepts as block evidence, so they are withheld until a fixed checker passes review. The source did not report a data date. Why these answers are held ↗

Source: https://api.voidly.ai/v1/isp/index?country=VE

Editorial service list

Know the named targets.

Undated editorial context. Check current evidence before treating a service as blocked.

Some news sitesSocial media during protests
Domain-check status and limits

Country guidance

Keep alternatives ready.

The original country recommendations are preserved below. They are undated guidance, not a guarantee of access or safety.

  • Use Voidly VPN
  • Enable a kill switch (Voidly Desktop: macOS and Linux only)
  • Use mesh networking during shutdowns

Questions, answered

Venezuela, in context.

Is the internet censored in Venezuela?

The dated 7-day index score is 14/100. That describes the source sample, not every person, network or domain in Venezuela.

Venezuela blocks opposition news sites and social media during political unrest. Internet shutdowns occur during protests.

Use the recent records and their original sources to investigate a particular restriction. Disruption alone does not establish intentional censorship.

Which websites and services are affected in Venezuela?

The editorial list names: Some news sites, Social media during protests. It is undated context, not a current availability check.

Results can differ between networks, measurement times and targets. Country incident records and the country API preserve source details.

How does Venezuela compare with other countries?

Original snapshot rank: #8. Editorial risk tier: High. Editorial trend: stable. The tier and trend are curated context; they are not a measured change between recent dates.

The index includes a dated score window and a separate all-time measurement corpus. Compare like-for-like windows and inspect sample coverage before drawing a national comparison. Compare the index.

Which blocking methods appear in Venezuela?

The pipeline can record DNS interference, TCP resets, HTTP block pages, TLS/SNI failures and network-level outages. This list describes possible mechanisms; it does not claim every mechanism was observed in Venezuela.

Each incident and ISP record below retains its reported mechanism and evidence. Inspect the country evidence query before attributing a failure to deliberate blocking.

How recent is the data?

The index score snapshot was fetched . Its source serve-time can advance without changes in the underlying scores. The accumulating historical OONI file has no dated observation window.

Current country data, incidents, network state and models have independent source dates. The page read those responses . Public GET reads request five-minute revalidation; response read time is not observation time. Model POST requests remain uncached. This page does not continuously refresh. Missing, stale and uncovered responses remain labeled.

Subscribe to source feeds
How can I check a specific domain in Venezuela?

Direct domain-check output is temporarily withheld while source-safety review is in progress. The web checker, API, MCP and CLI do not currently provide a fresh check here.

Use dated country incident evidence to inspect reported domains, observation times and methods. Historical evidence is not a current availability result or a guarantee for every user.

Accessibility status and limits · MCP tool availability.

Can a VPN help with restrictions in Venezuela?

Results depend on local networks and the transport used. The source’s complete country guidance is preserved in the recommendations section. Voidly’s current product details belong on the VPN page; a measured probe result is not a safety or success guarantee.

How do I cite this Venezuela profile?

Use the canonical country URL, https://voidly.ai/ve, with your access date and the date of any source snapshot you quote. The citation below supports plain text and BibTeX copy/download. A model generation or page access date is not a publication date.

Voidly-original analysis is CC BY 4.0. Upstream records keep their own attribution and licenses.

Open evidence

Keep the citation attached.

Country JSON
Download .txt
Voidly Research. (n.d.). Venezuela Internet Censorship Profile. https://voidly.ai/ve (accessed 2026-11-18).

Citations use the public /ve URL. Access date is not publication date. Cite the individual source, observation time and model version when using a number.

Voidly-original analysis and annotations are CC BY 4.0. Upstream OONI, IODA and Censored Planet records retain their own licenses. Read and attribute the underlying evidence.

Agent summary

Facts: Venezuela: 7-day index score 14/100; 560,690 measurements in that score window. The sample does not establish a domain or service block verdict.

As of score observation: Unavailable. Score snapshot fetched: 2026-11-04T15:49:20.090Z. Fetch time is not the underlying measurement time. OONI source last fetched: ; this is a separate source fetch, not an observation time.

Sources: Unavailable in unavailable returned incident records, up to 10. Missing source lists: unavailable. This is not the score source count or independent corroboration.

Cite: Voidly Research. (n.d.). Venezuela Internet Censorship Profile. https://voidly.ai/ve (accessed 2026-11-18).

Use this in your agent

Connect the read-only Atlas MCP service, then select and copy this request into your agent.

Atlas MCP setup · Agent summary JSON · Endpoint: https://atlas-mcp.voidly.ai/mcp